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Abstract 
The paper intends to highlight the main ideological pillars of the work in progress in EU 
criminal repression, as expressed in: (a) the founding treaties, (b) their promotion via EU-
introduced criminal law, and (c) the case-law produced by the ECJ in its competence to interpret 
EU criminal law throughout its implementation. To serve this purpose, the presentation focuses 
on two key fields of EU interventions: penalizing fraud against the Union’s financial interests 
and terrorism. The research confirms both the supremacy of an EU ideology of aggressive self-
protection by means of criminal law, which promotes a purely economistic policy without limits 
outlined by the rule of law, and an ideology of security endorsing a contemporary pre-
preemptive criminal law which leads to the penalizing of thought and mass-monitors EU 
citizens. ECJ's reactions against this endeavor are sometimes detectable, albeit not a solid given. 
However, an essential monitoring of the Union law's punitive ideological deviations requires 
support from both member states and their judiciaries. 
 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
1. Ideology is a system of ideas and values, particularly of the foundations of economic and 
political theory and action1. Ideology is often contradicted to social scientific knowledge and 
may include estimations that are non-receptive of empirical criticism or evaluation2. As 
accurately observed, “to know and speak the truth is the essence of science, while expediency 
is the soul of ideology”3. 
2. Law expresses the ideological preferences of the forces prevalent during its shaping4, but 
also produces ideology itself. 
3. The relationship between law and ideology5 is influenced not only by the legislature, but also 
by its practical implementation, particularly by the judiciary. The primacy of expediencies 
                                                          
*This text is the English version of a presentation made at the 13th Panhellenic Conference of the Greek Association 
of Criminal Law on the topic of «Ideology and Criminal Law» which was held in Athens on 27-29.04.2018. 
1 Manolis Triantafillidis Institute (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki), Dictionary of Modern Greek Language, 
605. Cf. regarding the evoluation of the term in philosophy Ι. Manoledakis, Law and Ideology, Critical thoughts (in 
Greek), 2011, 107-109. 
2 See. Ι. Manoledakis, Introduction to Science (in Greek), 2nd ed., 127 et seq. 
3  See Ι. Manoledakis, Law and Ideology (in Greek), 225. 
4 See Ι. Manoledakis, 7 Stances on Law and Justice, 1992, 14-15. 
5 See in relation to this topic, Ν. Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung 1 (Positives Recht und Ideologie), 1970, 178 
et seq., where the author stresses that the sociological theory and research after Marx highlighted a very high level 
of complexity of the social system within which law is, at best, just a paremeter and therefore considers absolutely 
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unrelated to legal provisions and stemming from diverse ideological preferences during the 
application of law leads to the corrosion of the law and of the very idea of justice6. 
4. In democratic societies criminal law-associated ideology is linked to choices on punishment 
and the respect for human rights7. 
5. Monitoring the reprimanding ideology of criminal law has historically emerged -in particular 
via the Enlightenment- through control and limitation principles for criminal repression and by 
acknowledging rights to those afflicted by it8. 
6. The modern production of criminal law is not limited to the national level. Its provisions are 
drafted in an international environment and reflect the ideological preferences of the 
international organizations devised by the predominance of field-specific forces. Compared to 
the formation of national criminal laws, the corresponding international drafting process 
displays structural deficiencies in terms of democratic legitimacy9, and is quite frequently 
accompanied by inadequate consolidation of fundamental rights10. This is why checks and 
reservations on behalf of individual States -particularly those under an institutional framework 
acknowledging increased formal validity to ratified international conventions, such as the 
Greek one (Art. 28 § 1 CoG)- are of such great value. Nonetheless, each State still holds 
predominance over the ratification or not of an international convention and, hence, over the 
adopting or not of the latter’s ideological preferences regarding criminal repression. 
7. In supranational configurations such as the EU, as in any two-tier lawmaking system of 
vertical intervention by the overlaying on the underlaying (i.e. on Member States)11, things are 
different. Ideological preferences on criminal repression are expressed first and foremost 
through the founding treaties of such bodies, as, in our case, the EU. In addition, the diffusion 
and transposition in Member States of any ideology conveyed by individual legal instruments 
of (secondary) EU law with regard to criminal suppression, does not rely on the States’ freedom 
of choice to adopt them. Directives defining offenses and envisaging minimum sentences or 
procedural rules may express ideological preferences not endorsed by individual Member 
States, but are nevertheless binding, given the application of the principle of majority in the 
relevant field (Art. 294 TFEU). The only latitude available to Member States to remain unbound 
by such a directive is to evoke the exceptional mechanism of emergency suspension of 
legislative process [Articles 82(3) and 83(3) TFEU], which has so far remained unexploited by 
any Member State. Thus, EU’s ideological preferences on criminal repression are in principle 
                                                          
necessary a sociological theory of law, within the framework of which the first duty should be the clarification of 
the relationship between law and ideology. 
6 See, indicatively, comparing the majority and dissenting opinion in Judgement 11/2001 of the Supreme Court of 
Greece, Criminal Justice (in Greek) 2001, 1220 et seq. (which concerned the constitutionality of article 26 of 
law 2721/1999 regarding the statute of limitations of offenses of obstruction of transport which were committed by 
farmers during their demonstrations in March 1997) and the critical thoughts on this topic on the occasion of 
decisions that transferred the issue to the plenary by Ε. Symeonidou-Kastanidou, Amnesty and special statutory 
limitations, Criminal Justice (in Greek), 2001, 478 et seq. 
7 Cf. Ι. Manoledakis, General Theory of Criminal Law, 2004, 26 et seq. and especially 29. 
8 Cf. P.-A. Albrecht, Die vergessene Freiheit, 2003, 18 et seq. 
9 See, indicatively, Ι. Androulakis, Die Globalisierung der Korruptionsbekämpfung, 2007, 356. 
10 Since the latter is only provided to the extent that it is recognised by the concerned international treaties. See 
indicatively regarding the deficit in guaranteeing substantive and procedural rights to citizens in international 
legislation concerning money laundering, Ν. Paraskevopoulos, Money Laundering and Human Rights, in Union of 
Greek Penologists, Money Laundering, «Clean» or Free Society?, 2007, 40 et seq. 
11 See M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, The EU and US criminal law as two-tier models: A comparison of their central axes with 
a view to addressing challenges for EU criminal law and for the protection of fundamental rights, 2016, 12 et seq. 
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permeated and incorporated bindingly within Member States’ laws, which makes for a 
significant divergence compared to other internationally enacted criminal provisions. 
Furthermore, the lack of democratic legitimacy in EU lawmaking has been reduced through the 
involvement of the European Parliament in the legislative process, but is not yet utterly 
eradicated12. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that an increased risk exists for the 
predominance of ideological preferences of bureaucracy as a law-producing system. 
Furthermore, EU’s history reveals that the consolidation of fundamental rights that are 
particularly valuable to monitor the punitive ideology expressed by criminal law arrived very 
belated in relation to the development of EU institutions and instruments of criminal repression 
(Lisbon Treaty, December 2009). 
Finally, the ECJ is positively competent to interpret the secondary criminal law (Article 267 
TFEU), and can utilize this institutional capacity to scrutinize punitively aberrant ideological 
preferences. However, the ECJ is not a court specialized in criminal matters, while it has been 
the driving force of EU advancement13, even going beyond its institutional framework, which, 
however, does not apparently favor a role contrary to the relevant EU policy objectives, when 
this proves to be necessary. 
Following the abovementioned remarks, this paper attempts to highlight certain core 
ideological pillars of the now developing EU criminal repression, as expressed first and 
foremost in the founding treaties, in the correspondingly produced criminal provisions, and in 
the relevant ECJ case-law which interprets the EU criminal law throughout its implementation. 
2. CORE IDEOLOGICAL AXES OF CRIMINAL REPRESSION 
ACCORDING TO THE FOUNDING TREATIES 
EU’s competences of intervention in criminal law matters are committed to the creation of a 
single area of freedom, security and justice, i.e. the third major integration project of 
contemporary EU policy, following the single market and the monetary union14. 
In reading article 67 TFEU, one realizes that criminal law particularly pertains to paragraph 3 
thereof, according to which: “The Union shall endeavor to ensure a high level of security with 
the adoption of measures to prevent and combat crime,….., measures for the coordination and 
cooperation between police and judicial authorities …… and the mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions in criminal matters,…..” This general provision reveals the unilateral orientation of 
criminal law towards the security and facilitation of repressive mechanisms15. Concurrently, 
paragraphs 2 and 4 thereof, referring to freedom and justice, are equally disappointing. Freedom 
is perceived simply as freedom to move within a Union without internal borders, and justice 
only as the facilitated access to its apparatus through the principle of mutual recognition of 
                                                          
12 See M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and challenges for criminal law at the 
commencement of the 21st century, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2005, 500 and 
note 79. Cf. also BVerfG 2BvE 2/08, BvR5/08, BvR1010/08, BvR 1022/08, BvR 1259/08, BvR 182/09 of June 30th 
2009, paras 276 et seq. 
13 Regarding the scientific thoughts in relation to the role of the ECJ and the recognition of its decisive role in the 
process of unification, see Ε. Sahpekidou, European Law (in Greek), 2nd Ed., 2013, 517-518. 
14 See W. Weiß/H. Satzger, Art. 67, Rn 7-11, in Streinz, Kommentar EUV/AEUV., 2. Aufl., 2011. 
15 See, indicatively, in relation to the same choice made in the draft of the Treaty for the adoption of a Constitution 
for Europe, Th. Weigend, Der Entwurf einer europäischen Verfassung und das Strafrecht, ZStW 2004, 275-277, 302. 
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judicial decisions. This outlook has nothing to do with the concepts of freedom and justice of 
the European legal culture, as elaborated through the teachings of the Enlightenment16. 
Thus, one observes that the articulated ideological platform of EU criminal law development 
sets the scene for a criminal law containing an aggressively punitive rationale that has nothing 
to do with its subsidiarity and its use as ultima ratio as imposed by the rule of law principles. 
The ideological articulation of this prospect is distilled through the notion of security, a “super-
legal interest” which in reality is not such in itself, but rather the result of many different legally 
protected civil interests, such as life, physical integrity, property, etc.17 This notion of security 
as a tool, with its abstract and obscure features, facilitates the acknowledgement by individuals 
of violations against it where they do not actually exist, thus decomposing the principles of 
criminal law that require its operation as a last resort, under specifically defined concepts and 
subsidiarity. 
To ensure the vital balance between criminal law’s objectives within the EU founding context, 
one is compelled to resort to the combined interpretation and application of Article 67(1) TFEU 
and especially Article 6 TEU. These provisions establish EU’s commitment to respect 
fundamental rights and its accession to the ECHR. However, the hitherto unsuccessful 
accession to the ECHR18 -despite the exponential increase in EU legal instruments which 
facilitate repressive mechanisms- confirms the primacy of security in the abovementioned sense 
at an institutional and practical level. The same manifestation is documented by the mere 
quantitative comparison between legal instruments on criminal procedure (especially those 
promoting the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions) and those referring to a 
harmonized consolidation of procedural rights for suspects and defendants19. 
3. CENTRAL IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL 
REPRESSION IN THE CONTEMPORARY SECONDARY EU LAW: 
THE EXAMPLES OF FRAUD AFFECTING THE FINANCIAL 
INTERESTS OF THE EU AND TERRORISM 
Moving ahead to the secondary EU law via which the Union implements its political objectives 
in the field of criminal justice, two indicative samples should catch one’s attention: offenses 
against EU’s financial interests on one hand, and organized crime and terrorism on the other; 
the prior refers to the protection of EU’s own legally protected interests20 which are reasonably 
emphatically promoted, insofar as a subject to the fortification claims self-protection, while the 
                                                          
16 See P.-A. Albrecht, Die vergessene Freiheit, 11 et seq, 117 et seq. With regard to freedom cf. also K. Günther, 
Bedrohte  individuelle Freiheit im aufgeklärten Strafrecht-Welche Freiheit?, Kritische Justiz 2016/4, 520 et seq. 
17 See the analysis in Μ. Kaiafa-Gbandi, The Delimitation of the Offense of Terrorism and the Challenges in a Rule 
of Law-Oriented Criminal Law, in vol. ΙΙ for Manodelakis (in Greek), 2007, 271 et seq. and especially 276. 
18 See opinion 2/13 of ECJ (Plenary), 18 December 2014. 
19 See for a concise reference to them I. Anagnostopoulos, Rights of defendants in the EU-The directives 2010/64/EU 
and 2012/13/EU, Athens, 2017, 201 et seq (in Greek) and with regard to the future perspectives, op. cit., 203-204. 
20 Cf. the efforts that have been made already at the time the EU did not have competence of intervention through 
means of criminal law in the first (community) pillar of the previous regime. From this period derive not only the 
proposal of a directive on the criminal-law protection of the Community's financial interests (COM 2001 272 final 
and COM 2002 577 final) and the Green Book concerning the criminal protection of financial interests of the 
Community and the estsblishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (COM 2001 715 final), but also the 
famous draft Corpus Juris, which was produced upon assignment by the Commission to an experts’ team from 
various member states (see Corpus Juris 2000 Version of Florence, and M. Delmas-Marty/J. Vervaele (eds), The 
implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member States, Vol I 2000, Vol II 2000, Vol III 2000, Vol IV 2001). 
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latter encompasses areas of undoubtedly dire international criminality which is currently 
tremendously vexing21.  
3.1. On fraud affecting EU’s financial interests 
The Directive for EU-fraud and the EPPO Regulation were passed in July and October 2017, 
respectively. 
3.1.1. The EU Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by 
means of criminal law 
The Directive includes four focal points that reveal its ideological preferences: (a) the inclusion 
of VAT fraud in its scope, when total damages exceed € 10.000.000 and the relevant acts are 
linked to two or more countries, (b) the so-called “other criminal offenses against the financial 
interests of the EU”, (c) the penalties, and (d) the statute of limitations for specific criminal 
offenses. 
As regards point (a), VAT fraud appears in Art. 3 of the new directive as an act affecting EU’s 
financial interests22, in accord with the relevant ECJ case-law23. However, it is well-known that 
VAT revenue does not constitute in itself EU budget proceeds. It is property owned by the 
Member States and they are obliged to allocate a certain percentile of it to the Union. So, 
whatever damage is done to the EU assets is indirect, i.e. it signifies the inability of the Member 
State to reimburse evaded inflows from its own property24. The ECJ’s and the Directive’s 
opposing perspective on this issue essentially converts a national legally protected interest into 
an EU one, and incorporates it as such under the Union’s criminal protection regime. The 
scientific misconception can be understood, if one considers that the same argument may be 
used to turn any fraud against the national GDP that affects the calculation of the Member 
State’s contribution to the EU budget into an offense against the EU’s financial interests. 
The ideological footprint of the Union’s mindset is clear: the expediency behind the 
consolidation of tax collections to be apportioned to the EU turns a national legally protected 
interest into a Union’s one before it becomes such. Thus, it is defensible to say that the party 
under protection by criminal law strives to defend itself against damages on still unowned yet 
claimed assets, particularly insofar as they relate to its financial constituent. 
Furthermore, the ideological preference towards a concealed and perhaps voluntary confusion 
over the protected legitimate interest is apparent in the so-called “other criminal offenses 
against the financial interests of the Union” (Article 4). According to the Directive, these 
include money laundering of assets derived from EU-fraud, active and passive bribery that are 
detrimental or possibly detrimental to EU’s financial interests. However, it is highly doubtful 
that money laundering and the precedent offense affect the same legally protected interest, 
                                                          
21 See, inter alia, the agenda for security in Europe COM (2015) 185 final and for the most recent promotion of the 
relevant activities COM (2018) 470 final, 13.6.2018. On the agenda see Ath. Giannakoula, The European Agenda 
on Security-A comment, EuCLR 2016, 109 et seq. 
22 See the directive’s preamble (EU) 2017, 1371, para. 4. 
23 See indicatively the ECJ’s judgements in Aklagaren v. Hans Akerberg Fransson C-617/10, of February 26th 
2013, para 26 and Taricco I, C-105, 14, paras 37-38. 
24 See Th. Papakuriakou, Tax offenses Ι-Introductory Remarks, in S. Pavlou/Th. Samiou, Special Criminal Laws, 
5th update (in Greek), November 2016, 11-12.  
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while contemporary theory rightly rejects this outlook25. Therefore, money laundering of assets 
derived from EU-fraud does not assail EU’s financial interests. In addition, any detrimental or 
possibly detrimental bribery primarily and evidently affects another legitimate interest (public 
office, national or EU), which is anyhow safeguarded independently at EU level26. Therefore, 
drafting a whole set of provisions around EU-fraud and falsely labeling it “other offenses 
against the financial interests of the Union” serves but expediency by ideologically promoting 
the core choice to ensure effective protection of EU’s financial interests. In particular, it 
facilitates the establishing of EPPO competence for the prosecution of the relevant offenses27 
and, most importantly, by extension it instrumentalizes substantive criminal law for procedural 
purposes of effective prosecution. 
The logical continuation of this wearisome process extends to the field of penalties. Therein, 
sanctions for EU-fraud and for other offenses against the financial interests of the Union 
[Article 7(3)] are not distinguished from a demerit perspective when the damage or benefit 
exceeds € 100.000. Then again, one rightfully wonders how abuses against different legally 
protected interests –namely, EU assets and public office- are equated, especially when the latter 
requires an additional damage or threat against the Union’s financial interests28. Evidently, the 
ideological confusion over what is punishable and the focus on procedural expediencies does 
not benefit compliance with the proportionality principle. 
The primacy of effectiveness in the protection of the Union’s financial interests is also obvious 
in EU’s novel provision on the statute of limitations for the corresponding offenses, which 
imposes a minimum time threshold for the limitation of serious EU-fraud offenses (Article 
12)29. This intervention in the criminal justice systems of Member States is incompatible with 
EU’s primary law. Of course, this establishes the obligation to provide effective protection of 
Union assets, but in referring to criminal law in specific, it envisages that Member States shall 
take the same measures to counter EU-fraud as they do to thwart fraudulent acts violating their 
own financial interests. Therefore, Union law cannot institute an obligation for a special statute 
of limitations for violations against EU’s financial interests30.  
Consequently, the safeguarding of EU’s financial interests according to Union criminal law is 
typified not only by an apparent ideology of continuous expanding and offensive self-protection 
                                                          
25 See Ν. Chatzinikolaou, The criminal repression of the legalisation of revenues from criminal activities in Μ. 
Kaiafa-Gbandi (scientific supervision), Financial Crime and Corruption in the Public Sector, 1 Assessment of the 
current institutional framework (in Greek), 2014, 748 et seq, 758, 767, and the containing footnotes. 
26 Cf. the criticism to the draft directive M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, Criminalizing the violations of the EU’s financial 
interests, in Μ. Kaiafa-Gbandi (scientific supervision), Financial Crime and Corruption in the Public Sector, 1 
Assessment of the current institutional framework (in Greek), 2014, 476 et seq. 
27 See article 4 of the Regulation for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, according to which «the EPPO shall 
be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment the perpetrators of, and accomplices to, 
criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union which are provided for in Directive (EU) 2017/1371 
...». 
28 Μ. Kaiafa-Gbandi, Criminal Treatment of Violations of Financial Interest of the EU, in Μ. Kaiafa-Gbandi 
(scientific supervision), Financial Crime and Corruption in the Public Sector, 1 Assessment of the Current 
Institutional Framework (in Greek), 2014 , 480. 
29 Article 12 par. 2 foresees that: «Member States shall take the necessary measures to enable the investigation, 
prosecution, trial and judicial decision of criminal offences referred to in Articles 3, 4 and 5 which are punishable 
by a maximum sanction of at least four years of imprisonment, for a period of at least five years from the time when 
the offence was committed». 
30 Of course, this choice of the EU was obviously aiming for a relatively short deadline of statutory limitations that 
would not overturn the existing choices of member states. However, this constitutes a coincidental result without 
meaning that it does not lead to a problem in relation to the general institutional choice of determining a special 
statutory limitation for the crime of fraud against the financial interests of the EU. 
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which lacks inhibitions and exceeds competence, but also by an ideology of instrumentalization 
of substantive criminal law to guarantee full effectiveness of criminal repression. 
3.1.2. The EPPO Regulation 
The prevalence of effectiveness in suppression of offenses against EU’s financial interests is 
manifest in the recent EPPO Regulation31.  
Article 41 on the rights of suspects and defendants introduces a complementarity model 
between Union and national law to protect procedural rights, and a system promoting more 
favorable treatment (: when the national regime offers a higher degree of protection compared 
to its EU counterpart). Priority is given to the minimum level of protection foreseen by Union 
law for the relevant rights, while national provisions operate complementarily, either when they 
envisage a higher level of protection, or when they acknowledge rights not granted by EU 
legislation or by the ECHR. This system, is not as rights-friendly as it appears to be32. This is 
because of the increased complexity resulting from the combination of EU and national law 
and the multitude of applicable national provisions, which may even stem from different 
member states (e.g. on collecting evidence from different EU legal orders).33 In addition, this 
model does not ensure legal certainty and predictability to allow for the adoption of an effective 
legal defense, nor does it cancel the peril of a procedural tangle, where different levels of 
protection will coincide within the same criminal procedure, even referring to the same right 
(as, per example, when a suspect has been examined in more than one member states, the right 
to silence and non-self-incrimination). Besides, this system cannot obstruct the mutual 
recognition of judicial decisions of other member states as far as they are based on the lower 
protection level proscribed by the EU.   
At the level of consolidating human rights, this setting confirms the primacy of an ideology of 
aggressive EU self-protection by means of criminal law which managed to prevail, 
unsurprisingly with responsibility of the represented Member States -such as Greece- through 
enhanced cooperation, to the extent that the proposed provisions did not win unanimity34. 
3.2. Core ideological axes of criminal suppression of terrorism 
In the field of terrorism, on the other hand, the new Directive ((EU) 2017/541) commands a 
change of paradigm in the role of the criminal law, as characteristically palpable in the 
introduction of punishability for traveling with the intent of terrorist acts and for organizing or 
facilitating such journeys (Articles 9 & 10). In particular, the neutral act of traveling from or to 
a Member State with the intention to participate in the activities of a terrorist group or for the 
purpose of providing or receiving training to commit terrorist acts becomes punishable, and so 
does its attempted variants (Article 14(3) (!). The radical leap in punishability within what I 
                                                          
31 Regulation (ΕU) 2017/1939, of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
32  See criticism regarding the efforts made at different stages of the proposal for the regulation, M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, 
The establishment of an EPPO and the rights of the suspects and defendants: Reflections upon the Commission’s 
proposal and the Council’s amendments, in European Criminal Policy Initiative (ed. by P. Asp), 2015, 245-246. 
33 With regard to investigations and the collection of evidence (which are obviously related to relevant rights of 
suspects and defendants) under the EPPO regime see P. Csonka/A. Juszczak/E. Sason, The Establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office, eucrim 2017, 129-130. See also therein (op. cit) the possible involvement of 
more Member States within the EPPO’s activities. 
34 A total of 20 member states cooperated in the end for its establishment (16 already at the voting stage of the 
regulation, see preamble).  
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have already named pre-preemptive repression35 (in view of the past regime of Framework 
Decisions on terrorism) is articulated in a scientifically inaccurate, ideological manner, appears 
as a punishment of preparatory acts, and consists in the fact that the herewith punishable acts 
themselves do not indicate any link whatsoever with terrorism. Thus, the weight of 
punishability is inevitably conveyed by a criminal purpose, which cannot be derived from the 
punishable act, given that a trip itself or even an entry into a country can never express it. Here 
lies the big difference with the punishing in exceptional circumstances of various acts 
traditionally viewed as preparatory in our criminal law (e.g. those of high treason-Art. 135 grCC 
or of explosion-Art. 272 grCC). In these cases, the corresponding acts reflect -at least in view 
of their characteristics- a certain risk to the legitimate interests, and allow for the drawing of a 
conclusion on the intended ensuing offense. However, as long as the objective basis of 
punishability is not defined in such a way that enables such a link, any legitimization of criminal 
law intervention remains feeble, while the subsequent uncertainty for the inspected citizen 
becomes apparent. 
This pre-preemptive criminal law -which now administers a set of preventive measures before 
any kind of actual risk surfaces against legally protected interests- essentially ends up 
repressing thought. It often utilizes a misleading terminology, thereby concealing the scientific 
truth. So, it is noticeable, for example, that the so-called “recruitment” of terrorists according 
to the directive is nothing more than a simple incitement of another person to commit or to 
contribute to the commitment of a terrorist crime, i.e. a mere attempt to instigation36. These 
misleading and bloated designations facilitate the approval of the provisions and the 
requirement for strict penalties. At the same time, though, they become an aspect of political 
management of criminal law37. 
This assignment of punishability on neutral acts has a very significant accompanying upshot. 
Acts such as the travelling for terrorist purposes, if the specific purpose is lacking, may be 
committed by almost everyone. Monitoring them in a wider relevant context -since such acts 
individually may not reveal the purpose- is the next step in criminal repression, to enable the 
collection of information as to which of them could be of State interest in combatting terrorism. 
Hence, the ideology of security not only becomes a lever for promoting a criminal law which 
moves slowly but steadily from punishing acts to punishing thought but also develops into the 
justification for mechanisms of mass citizen surveillance through the collection and exchange 
of personal data of persons flying from country to country38. 
                                                          
35 See Μ. Kaiafa-Gbandi, The prevention of terrorism and the criminal law of the pre-preventive criminal repression: 
New offenses for the fight against terrorism in the EU, Criminal Chronicle (in Greek) 2009, 397-398. Cf. also 
regarding the extension of the related criminality, Ε. Symeonidou-Kastanidou, «Violent Extremism at the Target of 
the EU», Criminal Chronicle (in Greek) 2009, 585-586. 
36 See regarding the deceiving terminology Kaiafa, Criminal Chronicle (in Greek) 2009, 388, 393-394, 396. 
37 See Ι. Manoledakis, 7 Stances on Law and Justice (in Greek), 1992, 50-51. Cf. also, Ν. Dimitratos, Problems of 
criminal dogmatic at the doorstep of the third millennium, Criminal Chronicle (in Greek) 2000, 381-384, Ν. 
Paraskevopoulos, Targeting the majorities (in Greek) 2003, 26, as well as P. Landerville, From Social inclusion to 
management of risks? The policies and practices in the chapter of punishments, Criminal Justice (in Greek) 2005, 
1461 et seq. See also on the same topic, regarding the symbolic criminal law, especially, W. Hassemer, Symbolisches 
Strafrecht und Rechtsgüterschutz, NStZ 1989, 553-559, W. Hassemer, Das Symbolische am symbolischen 
Strafrecht, FS für C. Roxin, 2001, 1001-1019, F. Sack, Symbolische Kriminalpolitik und wachsende Punitivität, in 
B. Dollinger/H. Schmidt-Semisch, Handbuch der Jugendkriminalität, 2011, 70 et seq. 
38 See the PNR agreements of the EU with third countries, which caused significant problems in light of the much 
lower protection level of personal data in such countries. The beginning occurred in 2003 under the pressure of the 
USA. Today, the EU has signed such agreements with the USA, Canada and Australia. An agreement with Mexico 
is currently under negotiation, while the same is expected to occur with Japan prior to the Olympic Games of 2020. 
The concluded agreements have multiple problems of deficient protection of private life and personal data. The 
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On the other hand, it is noticeable that while the objective of combating and preventing 
terrorism relates to a “super-purpose” of safeguarding a multitude of legally protected interests 
-including modern democracies themselves39- and is thus presented as something quite 
exceptional that requires a “special” approach, the relevant provisions’ content attests that the 
assumed measures do not relate to any such “special” issue, as evident in the headings of the 
relevant legal acts or their preambles. The extent of the Prüm convention, for example, which 
has been included in the EU acquis and refers not only to terrorism but to a batch of various 
offenses which are not even defined and need not be transnational in nature,40 is representative 
of provisions that pass under the pretext of terrorist threat to extend their application on a whole 
range of violations, for which they are impossible to justify in terms of proportionality (e.g. 
automatic online access to protected information stored in personal information databases of 
other Member States, such as DNA profiles).41 
If one adds the Union’s plans to enable interoperability between existing databases to this 
picture,42 then the system of mass monitoring as to the subject of reference (i.e. as to whom it 
concerns) will also begin to acquire features of massive-scale application to the subjects under 
monitoring, since inter-functionality refers to databases automatically accessible by several 
operators, even from different jurisdictions.43 
In promoting the ideology of security, the EU anti-terrorism legislation not only increasingly 
compromises itself with the retribution of thought, but is also constantly supplemented by 
measures of mass citizen surveillance, to achieve identification of the individuals whose 
criminal purpose it seeks to suppress, as the acts it punishes cannot express it. In this way, the 
ideology of security erodes the rule of law and fails to objectively promote the security it 
promises, as it covertly infringes a numerous rights of persons entirely uninvolved to the 
problem it seeks to address. 
                                                          
opinion of the ECJ on the agreement with Canada (1/15 of July 2017) identified a long list of violations of 
fundamental rights in this agreement, which led to the initation of negotiations for a new agreement. Besides, on the 
basis of the view of the ECJ, one can identify much more significant problems in the agreement that has been 
concluded with the USA, while one can also identify problems even in the EU Directive 2016/681 on the use of 
passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences 
and serious crime. See Μ. Kaiafa-Gbandi, The EU-paradigm on information exchange for the purpose of crime 
control and the challenge for the protection of personal data: shifting to a “borderless” information exchange for 
controlling terrorism?, under publication (in Greek). 
39 See, inter alia, the preamble of Directive (EC) 2017/541 para 2.  
40 The transposition into EU law of the Prüm Convention, which was initially signed by seven member states, was 
accomplished via Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA. Despite the substitution of specific 
provisions through the abovementioned Decisions, the Convention retained their substance and its applicability on 
what was not included in the Council Decisions (article 35 para 1 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA), while its 
articles 1-3, 8, 9 and 12 unambiguously expose the expansion of its applicability provisions in “criminal offences 
and their investigation” in general.  
41 See rel. E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou, DNA analysis and criminal trial: the European institutional framework, in M. 
Kaiafa-Gbandi /C. Prittwitz, Monitoring and crime suppression in modern criminal policy, 2011, pp. 114 et seq. 
42 See 5th Directive on money-laundering, (EU) 2018/843, 30.5.2018, and the therein promoted interconnection of 
central bank account archives in the member states, to serve the general purpose of interoperability between the 
databases under construction in the EU. See also for the ambitious interoperability plan, COM/2017/0794 final - 
2017/0352 (COD), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EL/TXT/PDF/. 
43 See Μ. Kaiafa-Gbandi, The EU paradigm on exchanging information for crime control and the challenges on the 
protection of personal data: towards a “borderless” information exchange to combat terrorism (publication pending).  
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4. THE ECJ CASE-LAW: A RULE-OF-LAW BULWARK AGAINST THE 
EU IDEOLOGY OF CRIMINAL REPRESSION IN THE AREA OF 
FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE? 
The next issue of concern is whether the ECJ -according to its competence to interpret EU law- 
monitors the Union’s ideological preferences that do not comply with its founding Treaties and 
its institutional framework in general, or it promotes such ideological divergences by 
supporting them. 
Two interrelated ECJ Grand Chamber decisions (Τaricο I44 and II45) are depictive of this 
reflection. 
Tarico I was a preliminary ruling to a question submitted by an Italian court in a case of 
establishment and participation in a criminal organization intending to commit VAT-related 
offenses, which would certainly become foregone (by 8.2.2018 at the latest) prior to the issuing 
of a decision, despite the interruption of the limitation period. Considering that specific 
provisions of primary EU law46 were violated on account of these events, the requesting court 
believed that if it were allowed to circumvent the national provision on limitation, this would 
guarantee the effective implementation of EU law. 
The ECJ considered that the Italian court essentially asked for clarification on whether national 
legislation on the limitation period ends up impeding the effective countering of VAT fraud. It 
replied that the national court should verify whether the national provisions practically allow 
for the effective reprimand of serious EU-fraud cases; if not, the national court must ensure full 
effectiveness of EU law, rendering -if necessary- national problematic provisions inapplicable, 
without having to pursue or await upon their abolishment through legislative channels or any 
other constitutional process (paragraph 49)47 48. 
This ECJ ruling deconstructs the rule of law, and is dogmatically flawed49. Indeed, it is easy to 
imagine that national rules on the statute of limitations must remain outright inapplicable 
because they contradict EU law, but what does this imply? In practice, it means that the offense 
is not subject to any limitation period, as the judge may not assign new, longer limitation 
intervals for each specific case. However, the de facto abolition of the statute of limitations lies 
outside the competence of the judiciary, as it violates the principle of separation of powers. 
                                                          
44 See case C-105/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:555, of 8 September 2015 (Grand Chamber). 
45 See case C-42/17, ECLI:EU:C:2017:936, of 5 December 2017 (Grand Chamber). 
46 Those relating to healthy competition (articles 101, 107 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union) 
and the case for healthy finance in every member state (article 119 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union), as well as Directive 2006/112/ΕΚ (article 158) for VAT. 
47 Considering the supremacy of the EU law, article 325 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
results in rendering automatically inapplicable any opposing provision of national legislation (thought 52). 
48 Nevertheless, in case the national Court does not implement the national provisions, it is obliged, according to the 
ECJ, to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of the concerned individuals (thought 53). However, according to 
the Court, article 49 of the Charter does not pose a problem in the concerned case, because on the basis of the above 
approach the consequence will only be the non-reduction of the expiration of the general staturoty limitation in the 
framework of pending criminal proceedings (thought 55). 
49 See regarding the criticism, Μ. Kaiafa-Gbandi, The recent jurisprudence of ECJ in criminal cases: The Protection 
of Fundamental Rights in EU Law and its Signifcance for the Greek Criminal Judge, Criminal Chronicles (in Greek) 
2017, 567 et seq .Cf. contra F. Viganò, Supremacy of EU Law vs (Constitutional) National Identity: A new challenge 
for the Court of Justice from the Italian Constitutional Court, EuCLR 2017, 119. 
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In Taricco I, the ECJ seems to not have accounted for the fact that the limitation period is 
grounds for eradication of punishability in many national legal systems, i.e. an institution of 
substantive criminal law. This means that any change to the relevant current regime can only 
be governed by the (even retroactive) application of the more lenient version for the defendant, 
in accordance with the respective fundamental principle bindingly enshrined in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Art. 49)50. Therefore, even if ECJ’s outlook as expressed in Taricco I were 
to be accepted, it could never encompass pending cases. 
Finally, the inclusion of the statute of limitations in a legal order’s substantive criminal law 
and, specifically, its punishability-abolishing aspect (as the case is in Greeκ law) render the 
ensuing application of the legality principle reasonable, as the elimination of punishability 
eradicates the offense by annulling the prospect of punishment. Hence, predictability as to the 
statute of limitations is imperative for citizens, as is the provision envisaging the threatened 
penalty. 
In view of these setbacks and immediately after Taricco I was issued, it is no coincidence that 
the Italian justice submitted questions to its Constitutional Court for similar cases. In turn, the 
latter turned to the ECJ and asked it to examine whether the primacy of EU law extends to cases 
where its application would infringe fundamental principles of the Italian constitutional order, 
such as the principle of legality51. 
Fortunately, ECJ’s response to the new question of the Italian Constitutional Court renounced 
its former perspective, although it is obvious that the ECJ tried very hard in its judgement not 
to let its retreat be recognizable. It avoided also to answer the delicate question of a possible 
supremacy of EU law over the Italian Constitution52. It accepted however expressis verbis that 
“the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege” principle is vital to the Union’s legal order and may 
not be undermined by the obligation to ensure effective collection of EU’s own assets 
(paragraph 52). 
This recoil on behalf of the ECJ is an essential victory of all those insisting on the effective 
protection of fundamental rights within the Union. More generally, it is a victory for the 
primacy of law against an economistic and short-sighted ideology of effective protection of the 
Union budget, which deliberately disregards that even the safeguarding of financial interests by 
the self-protecting State may only be implemented to the advantage of its citizens, for the 
benefit of whom it exists. 
Consequently, despite the risk involved in trying to draw general conclusions from a typical -
yet exemplary- application of an ECJ judgement, one can rather securely argue that the 
monitoring process of EU’s contemporary punitive ideology during the implementation of 
Union law by its institutionally appointed custodian, the ECJ, remains open and may support a 
                                                          
50 See in relation to the application of the most lenient criminal provision in the jurisprudence of the ECJ, decision 
of 3.5.2005 in the joined cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 (Berlusconi et al.) and decision of 6.10.2016, case 
C-218/15 (Paoletti et al.). 
51 See Corte Const., no 24/2017, and the related presentation of Viganò, EuCLR 2017,107 et seq. Cf. also regarding 
the broad critical discussion of this decision in the Italian criminal theory Viganò, see above, 110, fn. 25.  
52 See I. Dimitrakopoulos, The principles of legal certainty, of accuracy and foreseeability-The statute of limitation 
in cases of offenses with regard to VAT and the relationship between national Constitution, The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU and ECHR in the ECJ’s judgements Taricco I and Taricco II, in 
http://www.humanrightscaselaw.gr/uploads/4/8/0/3/48039377/taricco___%CF%83%CF%87%CE%AD%CF%83
%CE%B7_%CE%A3_%CE%A7%CE%AC%CF%81%CF%84%CE%B7_%CE%95%CE%A3%CE%94%CE%9
1.pdf,  15 (in Greek). 
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kind of optimism for the future. Nevertheless, it needs backing through the contribution of its 
Member States, as proven by the recent example set by the Italian justice. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Lastly, allow me the following observation: as noticed, the EU’s contemporary institutional 
activities have turned the delivery of drastic self-protection of the Union’s financial interests 
and the gradual -yet unremitting- shift toward punishing thought within a criminal law of 
security which extends to the mass monitoring of citizens to locate the carrier of the criminal 
mind, into central ideological pillars of criminal repression. These punitive deviations express 
ideologies that are detrimental to criminal law and are also found outside the EU context, e.g. 
in the Greek criminal tax legislation and its statute of limitations53. However, we should not 
forget that monitoring this divergence in our national law is much easier to do and can be 
effective if we so wish, with the widespread constitutionality control over criminal provisions. 
On the contrary, the punitive ideology expressed through EU law is quite difficult to monitor 
and possible only by means of questions addressed to the ECJ. This is why it is high time we 
sought active participation in the production of EU criminal law, with expertise and meritocratic 
selection in the core of our country’s representation (even at the level of legislative 
bureaucracy), and by exhausting the possibilities provided in EU’s institutional framework, 
aiming at the formulation of a criminal law in favor of all EU residents. In addition, it is crucial 
to preserve the importance of national judges in the application of EU criminal law to monitor 
any ideology that clashes the rule of law. To this end, the example of the Italian Constitutional 
Court’s queries to the ECJ in Taricco II bears the best testimony. We have established the 
freedoms of the European legal culture together, and together in unison we must defend them. 
EU’s institutional framework offers this potential; we simply need to exploit it, and not to 
retreat to a political management of criminal law for ephemeral goals. 
                                                          
53 See Th. Papakuriakou, Tax offenses Ι-Introductory Remarks, in S. Pavlou/Th. Samiou, Special Criminal Laws, 
5th update (in Greek), November 2016, 43 et seq. and especially 47. 
 
